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Abstract  
 
Longitudinal data are superior to cross-sectional data for explaining social processes. Yet, 
the existing division of labour in social science is a serious handicap for causal 
understanding of human behaviour. This is demonstrated in this article with the quite 
unrelated coexistence of sociological research on life histories and psychological research 
on individual development. Two examples are discussed: the intergenerational 
reproduction of social inequalities and the openness versus closedness of labour markets. 
Though there is an increasing awareness of problems of selectivity and unobserved 
heterogeneity in conventional social research, statistical modelling of these problems 
cannot replace the need for transdiciplinary data collection and research.  
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Résumé 
 
Les données longitudinaux sont préférables aux données de période pour expliquer les 
processus sociaux. Par ailleurs, la division du travail dans les sciences humaines présente 
un handicap à la compréhension causale des activités humaines. Par exemple, il existe en 
même temps la recherche sociologique sur les événements de la vie, et la recherche 
psychologique sur le développement individuel. On considère deux exemples: la 
reproduction inter-génération de l’inégalité sociale, et l’ouverture ou la fermeture des 
marchés de main d’oeuvre. Quoiqu’il y ait une plus importante appréciation des problèmes 
de sélection et de hétérogénéité non-observée dans la recherche sociale conventionnelle, la 
modélisation statistique de ces problèmes ne peut pas substituer à la collection de données 
et la recherche transdisciplinaire.  
 
Key Words:    GSOEP,  GLHS,  causal understanding, life course research,  
inter-disciplinary perspective,  control beliefs, individuality, action 
theory 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Compared to cross-sectional studies, longitudinal studies are very expensive in terms of 
money and time. Yet, the analytical superiority of longitudinal over cross-sectional 
information is unquestioningly accepted in many disciplines. The establishment of large-
scale longitudinal surveys in the social sciences during the last two decades in many 
countries is a success story in itself - though the analytical potential of the existing 
longitudinal data is still ‘greatly under-utilized’ (Mayer 1999:1). 
 
In the following pages, I try to make a provisional assessment of such studies, and my view 
is focussed in several respects. First, my main interest lies in confronting the aim of causal 
explanation of social phenomena with the design of existing studies. In other words, I raise 
the question whether these designs are actually able to meet the demand not only to 
describe but also to understand causes and consequences of social and demographic 
change. Specifically, I will argue that a new generation of longitudinal studies is needed to 
pursue this aim, because the analytical potential of existing studies is limited in this 
respect, not least on the grounds of obsolete disciplinary and methodological boundaries in 
the social sciences. However, when discussing the shortfalls of current longitudinal survey 
projects, I do not at all want to detract them from their pioneering merits and overall 
usefulness. 
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Second, it is almost impossible to discuss the whole range of longitudinal studies and their 
respective rationales. So, I adopt here the theoretical perspective of the life course and the 
aim of life course research to understand the processes by which social change operates to 
influence the development and life chances of individuals and by which these 
developments in turn lead to change of entire social systems. 
 
Third, my experiences reflect mainly the German background in this field, though Iwill not 
discuss it independent of the international experience. In the case of Germany, I mostly 
draw on two multipurpose, multi-domain survey projects, which together form the core of 
ongoing programs of longitudinal research in Germany since the early 1980s. These two 
are the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP) and the German Life History Study 
(GLHS) of which eight surveys have been conducted up to now. They represent two partly 
competing, partly complementary strategies of collecting longitudinal survey data. 
 
My line of argumentation is as follows. First, I recall the initial claims and promises of 
longitudinal survey research in social science. I refer to deficits in the realization of these 
claims and promises as the existing longitudinal surveys were designed and established. It 
is crucial for this discussion to confront the ideal of ‘unitary social science’ with the 
existing division of labor between the research programs of various disciplines in the field 
of life course research. To make this rather abstract argument more explicit, I shall refer to 
two different research questions. That the existing division of labor underlying the design 
of current longitudinal studies cannot be maintained is first demonstrated for research 
agenda in the mainstream of classical as well as contemporary sociology, namely the 
intergenerational reproduction of social inequality. Then I shall give some examples of 
how the inclusion of a specific psychological concept, namely control beliefs, may enhance 
our understanding of individual life courses. The last section provides an outlook on some 
possibilities for future, promising longitudinal study designs beyond the existing surveys. 
 
 
Life Course Research  
 
The Claims and Promises of Longitudinal Research 
 
Longitudinal social research is integrally linked to the study of social change. On various 
grounds, longitudinal data are much more powerful to capture social change than cross-
sectional data, even repeated cross-sectional data.
1 Not least among them is the intended 
social change, that is, the impact of the state on the life course, and challenges for and 
consequences of public policy for the better life of people (Mayer and Müller, 1986; Mayer 
1997). Therefore, public policy in general, and social policy in particular, is the primary 
audience for such type of research (e.g. Burkhauser and Smeeding, 1999). Longitudinal 
social research should uncover the mechanisms by which undesirable outcome could be 
avoided and favorable outcomes could be reached. Especially in the late sixties and the 
seventies, the Zeitgeist and social democratic governments in particular were optimistic 
about their ability to mould a better society (Etzioni, 1968; Zapf, 1996).         Therefore,  
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government agencies were interested in getting more and better information about how and 
why the standard and the distribution of material living conditions and subjective  quality 
of life developed, and how they could be shaped by policy making. Thus, almost 
everywhere in the industrialized countries, the establishment of longitudinal social research 
was (co-)initiated, or at least (co-) funded by governmental agencies. 
 
The theoretically most ambitious and most comprehensive approach to design such 
longitudinal surveys is the life course approach. It promises not only to describe but also to 
explain social phenomena as outcomes of past and ongoing processes at different levels of 
individual and societal development. In other words, the explicit aim of life course 
research is to capture the processes by which social change operates to influence the 
development and life chances of individuals and by which these developments fit into the 
reproduction and change of whole social systems. In particular, this perspective permits the 
following advances compared to conventional, cross-sectional information and concepts: 
 
 
•  Instead of single, one-shot measurements of status attainment, class position, or 
welfare positions at a given time point, which may be more or less stable, more 
comprehensive lifetime accounts of positions within the system of social inequalities 
are possible. 
 
•  Present living conditions and life events can be traced back to, and, thus, partly 
explained, by constraints and opportunities in the individuals’ past biographies. In this 
sense, the individual life course has to be understood as a “self-referential, multi-
dimensional process” (Huinink 1995:155). 
 
•  The unique ‘tools’ to do this adequately are measurements of the real time processes 
in different spheres of the individual life and the mathematical modeling of their 
interplay. Instead of focusing on normative concepts like life phases or the life cycle, 
‘multidimensional, parallel time clocks’ in the form of several events and durations 
(e.g. age, labor force experience, firm tenure, marriage time and marriage duration) 
would reflect successive, parallel, or overlapping processes. These processes, when 
combined with a cohort design, additionally permit to differentiate between age, 
period, and cohort effects (e.g., Mayer and Huinink, 1990; Alwin, 1995). 
 
•  Old and sterile disjunctions between the aggregate, structural macro world on the one 
hand and the idiosyncratic or over-generalized micro world of individual action on the 
other hand may be overcome (Huinink, 1995:56-94; O’Rand, 1996:3; Mayer 1999:4). 
Life courses are to be seen as results of complex interactions between processes 
operating at different ‘levels’ (Huinink, 1995:68) - social institutions, structural 
constraints and opportunities, individual development, and individual action under 
conditions of historical change. Especially important for studies in the field of social 
inequalities and labor markets is the distinction between positions and persons who 
move between these positions. 
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•  Insofar as the different life domains and ‘levels’ included in the analysis touch the 
research areas of different scientific disciplines, life course research claims to have a 
transdisciplinary perspective and to overcome fruitless fragmentations in the social 
sciences and humanities. 
 
In sum, the life course approach should thus be the ideal basis for the concept of causation 
as a ‘generative process’ of regularities. This concept was favoured by John Goldthorpe 
for the social sciences over the inadequate concept of ‘causation as robust dependence’ and 
the more rigorous, but too narrow and, for the sociological research questions, often not 
applicable, concept of ‘causation as consequential manipulation.’ By ‘causation as 
generative process’, Goldthorpe means that observed regularities (instead of 
idiosyncrasies) are identified as ‘effects for which causes have to be discovered’ and tested 
empirically. These empirical tests should be closest to a ‘subject-matter’ account of actions 
and interactions of individuals generating the observed regularities in time and space 
(Goldthorpe, 1998:21-22; see also Esser, 1991; Lindenberg, 1989 for the claims of rational 
choice theory in general). In the following section, I shall discuss which design of life 
course research is actually able to meet this demand. 
 
Even life course data do not allow for controlled manipulation, neither of the explananda 
nor of possible causes.  Yet, they at least provide the opportunity to study processes 
(trajectories, durations) within the lives of particular individuals, or households and 
families, under different circumstances over time (Wu, 1999:16). ‘Changes’ in both 
explananda and causes are, thus, not mere variations across different individuals at a given 
time, as in cross-sectional studies. But, they are real changes for given unities of 
observation, such that it is possible to control for (unobserved) conditions other than 
specific trajectories - common causes for both the explananda and the conditions that may 
lie ‘behind’ such trajectories. Technically speaking, new methods of statistical modeling 
have been developed to control for unobserved heterogeneity and selectivity, but I shall not 
touch upon this aspect in much detail here. 
 
 
Interdisciplinary Longitudinal Social Research in Germany:  
GSOEP and GLHS 
 
In Germany, the ‘big start’ (Mayer, 1999:1) of longitudinal studies in social science 
occurred with the start of the Special Research Unit on “Microanalytical Foundations of 
Social Policy” at the Universities of Frankfurt and Mannheim in 1979, consisting of 
researchers in sociology, economics, and the political sciences. This is the scientific 
context in which both the German Life History Study (GLHS) and the German Socio-
economic Panel Study (GSOEP) developed. The first national surveys of the GLHS started 
in 1981, and the first wave of the GSOEP in 1984. GSOEP and GLHS represent decidedly 
different strategies to collect longitudinal social survey data. 
 
 
 
 Theoretical Issues – Martin Diewald 
 224
The GSOEP 
 
The German SOcioEconomic Panel Study
2 is a prospective longitudinal survey based on a 
random sample of private households, clustered by regions. All ‘adults’ (16 years and 
older) in these households are then interviewed annually. From the very beginning two 
levels of analysis were envisioned in the survey design: the individual and the household, 
whether one makes use of it or not. New households in the sample come about only if they 
are established by members of the original households - after leaving the parental home, by 
marriage, or divorce etc. In these cases, all members of the new households are 
interviewed. The overall sample size in the year 2000 comprises about 20,000 individuals 
as members of about 12,000 households. 
 
Although in every panel some information is collected about the timing of events and the 
duration of current states, the ideal of collecting continuous, uninterrupted life histories in 
various life domains has not been fulfilled. Additionally, retrospective information about 
the life course before the first interview is obtained, but compared to the retrospective life 
courses collected in the GLHS (see below), the information is quite rudimentary. 
 
With the focus on welfare development, information on psychological development is 
rather scarce and restricted to a few attitudes, values, and domain-specific satisfaction 
scales.  No indicators of abilities, performances, or efforts are available. In this respect the 
GSOEP is much more restricted than the PSID, where more concepts from social 
psychology and developmental psychology are included and can be used for explaining 
social and economic phenomena (see e.g., Duncan and Dunifon, 1998; Dunifon and 
Duncan, 1998).
3  It is also important to notice that in the GSOEP there is no information 
about the development of children before age 16, whereas in the PSID there are several 
‘child development supplements’ to collect developmental information in early life which 
may be important to explain later life course outcomes. 
 
 
The GLHS 
 
The German Life History Study is a retrospective study of individual life courses, that is, 
all information is gathered at the same time for the past life course beginning with birth. 
The study consists of random samples of different birth cohorts, which implies that the 
information can only be representative of the specific birth cohorts included in the study. 
Thus, while prospective panel studies face a problem of ‘period centrism’ as long as the 
period of observation is still short, the GLHS faces the problem of ‘cohort centrism.’  Even 
if taken together, the cohorts are not representative of the whole population at a given point 
in time. A specific problem of long-time retrospective studies is recall errors that may 
distort the data. Those events that may seem less relevant in the subjective reconstruction 
of biographies at the time of the interview are liable to be forgotten. ‘Less relevant’  for 
subjective biographies, however, does not mean that these events are also less relevant for 
research questions. 
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The retrospective life histories contain time-continuous (at the level of months) life 
histories of parallel processes in various life domains, normally without interruptions. 
Reliability of information in long-term retrospective data is best for education and 
employment history, parental status, marital and fertility history, and family and household 
composition (Peters, 1988; Dex, 1991). In addition, the possibility of modifying 
measurement instruments during the observation period, unlike as in panel studies, is 
excluded - unless introduced by design. 
 
Information about past individual or household income is less reliable. And it is widely 
accepted that information about past psychological development - such as competences, 
motivational states, affective states, or beliefs - cannot be retrieved with reasonable 
reliability (Featherman, 1979;  Hannan and Tuma, 1979). This is clearly a domain of 
prospective observations. As proxies for cognitive competences, sometimes past 
performances are included in retrospective surveys, such as school marks or performances 
in tertiary education. It has to be stated, however, that competences and performances are 
not at all the same, and that confounding the two is theoretically misleading. 
 
 
Advantages and Disadvantages of GSOEP and GLHS 
 
To study social change, the differentiation between age, period, and cohort effects is 
crucial (Mayer and Huinink, 1990; Alwin, 1995). By design, cohort studies are by far the 
best for disentangling these effects. Because of the non-cohort-design of the GSOEP and 
because of the less complete data, the estimation of cohort effects is severely restricted in 
comparison to the GLHS. And the analysis of period effects is limited in prospective 
panels because of the problem of period centrism for “young” panel studies. 
 
There is no contextual information beyond the individual (GLHS) or household (GSOEP) 
level in either survey. This carries a lot of weight when access to official data is far from 
easy (in Germany), especially to obtain fine-graded contextual information at the level of 
communities, neighborhoods or schools. Therefore, as a rule, a researcher cannot expect to 
combine the individual survey data with contextual information from other sources later on 
(as it often possible in the Scandinavian countries).  
 
Furthermore, in both surveys, no data account for the psychological development, except 
for some values and attitudes. In the case of the GLHS, this is self-evident (see above), 
whereas in the case of the GSOEP, this is the result of holding social reporting and social 
accounting of welfare development as the primary rationale for the survey design. Thus, 
both surveys are facing criticisms in recent state-of-the-art publications on life course 
research. Suggestions call for a fuller integration of life course research with research on 
individual development, which have remained as two distinct research traditions in the 
social sciences (Elder and O’Rand, 1995; Mortimer, 1996; Diewald 1999). 
 
The next two sections argue that both these restrictions  (lack of contextual information as 
well as of information on individual development) hamper not only the comprehensiveness 
of possible research questions but also the analytical power for the causal explanation of 
some of the core questions in sociology. It is not simply an argument about incomplete Theoretical Issues – Martin Diewald 
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information or a too ‘thin’ description of life courses; the standard sociological 
questionnaires are already overtaxed as single source of information.  But the point is that 
the instruments are often not sufficient to distinguish whether they measure effects of the 
social environment or of psychological characteristics of acting individuals. 
 
 
Fallacies in the Design of Existing Survey Designs 
 
Regarding the question of how  ‘generative processes’ (see the earlier section) must be 
tested in the social sciences, an increasingly disputed issue is what must be directly 
observable and, thus, what must be included in the statistical modeling to reconstruct these 
processes. Especially in the discussion about fruitful linkages between large-scale social 
surveys and rational choice theory,  many social scientists argue against the necessity of 
including data other than social characteristics and actions (Goldthorpe, 1998:23-25; Ultee, 
1996; see also most contributions in Blossfeld and Prein 1998). This shows up mostly as 
reluctance towards ‘subjective data,’ i.e. data that relate to individuals’ perceptions, 
evaluations, and orientations, or personality in general (for counter arguments, see Opp, 
1998). This reluctance may make sense in the case of cross-sectional information, where 
there is only correlation without temporal order. In such cases, sociologists may claim that 
for the understanding of social outcomes, psychological variables are of no use, since it is 
impossible to decide whether these psychological variables have any independent causal 
status compared to social structural or institutional factors (Mayer, forthcoming). I will 
argue in the following that such a strategy is a fallacy if a longitudinal design is available 
and if the goal is causal understanding. The general exclusion of  'individuality,' mistakenly 
seen as opposed to ‘regularity,’  in conventional social studies cannot be justified simply 
by bringing the ‘social’ or ‘structural’ in front against other effects and determinants of 
human behavior. Sociologists often claim a specific agenda for research on causal 
understanding by referring to the Durkheimian ‘explaining the social by the social.’ It is 
doubtful that Durkheim is really an authority for a strategy of restricting  oneself to explain 
the social only by the social (Albert, 1999:221). 
 
As I develop below, neglecting such information may often mean that standard 
sociological variables are loaded with too many possible theoretical meanings to be able to 
represent theoretically unambiguous determinants and effects of human behavior. I make 
my argument in three steps. First, I point out that the current division of labor in social 
science is a problem for true causal explanation. Second, I consider the life course 
approach in a transdisciplinary perspective that takes serious account of the claims and 
promises discussed earlier. And, third, I take a closer look at the problem of individuality 
for explanations based on rational choice theory. 
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(1) The historical division of labor in science and factors of causal       explanation 
 
It has been shown convincingly that the present demarcations between the various social 
science disciplines (sociology, psychology, economics, historical science, anthropology) 
do not follow so much a problem-focused logic as practical interests of researchers in the 
past and historical contingencies (Albert, 1999; Wagner, 1991). In other words, there is no 
clear distinction between different explananda that separate the various social science 
disciplines from one another. It is often proclaimed that different perspectives on possible 
explanatory factors are relevant for that. But as I show below, the Durkheimian ‘explaining 
the social by the social’ is by no means a powerful denominator to distinguish sociological 
from psychological explanations. 
 
A problem-focused research perspective, as it is called under the label of 
‘transdisciplinary’ research (Mittelstraß, 1998), should even go beyond the claim of a 
unitary social science to include also the nomological (not merely historical) explanations 
of human behavior that are proliferating in the natural sciences, especially in biology with 
its sub-disciplines (Meier, 1999).  Nomological explanations based on biology and 
evolutionary theory are neither necessarily connected with a rejection of theoretical 
institutionalism nor of methodological individualism (Albert, 1999:225-228). Rather, they 
can be successfully combined to give most comprehensive explanations of human behavior 
and the emergence and development of social institutions (Dux, 1997). Rather than basing 
explanations on pre-existing, but shaky disciplinary demarcations,  problem-focused 
research designs should try to take into consideration all factors that are relevant for causal 
understanding. Seen from this angle, thinking in present disciplinary boundaries must be 
replaced by a distinction between different classes of causal factors that could be more or 
less relevant for the explanation of specific phenomena. 
 
By adopting an evolutionary perspective, genetic, ecological, and social causal factors can 
be distinguished (Smith and Szathmáry, 1995; Wieser, 1997). In the following, I limit my 
argument to the interplay between social and genetic factors. It is important to notice that 
these causal factors are neither deterministic nor simply additive.  Since human beings are 
equipped with a nervous system including the brain, they are able to relate reflexively to 
their own behavior and its preconditions. Thus, the nervous system takes over the role of a 
hinge between the three classes of factors. Actual behavior is then guided by tactical 
responses to interacting, sometimes even conflicting, bundles of requirements, restrictions, 
and chances for individual development as they stem from genetic, ecological, or social 
factors accumulated over time. In this sense, the individual is indeed “co-producer of his or 
her development” (Lerner, 1984:3), and this perspective provides very straightforward 
grounds for a reconstruction of individual life courses, as well as institutional and 
structural developments, from the perspective of individual action (Giddens, 1976; 
Lindenberg, 1989). 
When I refer in the following to the interplay of genetic, ecological, and social causal 
forces, I do this not in every respect. I leave aside the question of how the genetic code of 
humans brings about natural selection and common behavioral patterns (see for this 
discussion, Runciman, 1998). I confine myself instead to the importance of differential Theoretical Issues – Martin Diewald 
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genetics, the differences between individuals in their genetic ‘equipment.’  
 
 
(2) The life course in a transdisciplinary perspective 
 
At the beginning of life course research, especially in sociology and psychology, also in 
economics and demography, there were “great expectations that the disciplines involved in 
this ‘life course turn’ … would not only grow together in a parallel trajectory, but there 
would be co-evolution in the direction of a truly interdisciplinary or even transdisciplinary 
paradigm on human development” (Mayer, forthcoming: 1). However, even optimists 
cannot say that this prophecy has come true or at least tends to become true nowadays. Life 
span psychology and life course sociology diverge not only in regard to the level of the 
unit of analysis (the major aspect of human lives and the relevant dependent variables) but 
also appreciably in regard to the broad causal forces, which are seen at work. (Mayer, 
forthcoming: 8-14). Though there are admittedly some common explananda in sociology 
and psychology, like values, occupational success, family development, or deviant 
behavior, life course sociology focuses predominantly on the interplay between different 
life events in different spheres of life (e.g., marriage, child births, divorce, or job careers) 
and time-independent social characteristics (e.g., gender, family of origin). The comparison 
of such life courses for different cohorts and/or societies is intended to unravel the impact 
of different institutional settings, historical events, and structural opportunities on human 
lives. Psychological traits and functional capacities of individuals are mostly seen as being 
‘not social’ and thus out of the realm of sociological explanations. This reluctance applies 
even more to the inclusion of psychological variables as explanatory variables. Whereas it 
is nice for sociologists to claim that ‘psychological’ traits are in fact social constructions, 
the other way round is quite awkward - to admit that what one observes as social 
characteristics may be shaped by psychological traits and functional capacities, too. And if 
one accepts or claims that the first proposition is true, then one can quite easily reject the 
second proposition, because psychological measurements then do not have any 
independent causal meaning compared to socio-structural factors but only a status as 
intermediary factor. 
 
In contrast, the psychology of individual development and life span focuses exactly, 
though not exclusively, on these psychological traits and functional capacities as 
explananda. The range of phenomena to be included here comprises on the one hand 
ontogenetic, mainly age-dependent, basic components of psychological functioning: 
functional capacities like cognitive abilities or speed information processing as well as 
basic, universal behavioral patterns like control strategies (Baltes, Lindenberger and 
Staudinger, 1999). On the other hand, a more ‘liberal’ concept of individual development 
focuses additionally on parts of the personality which are less determined by biology and 
age-dependent ontogenesis but formed by culture, social structure, and historical events 
(Brandstädter, 1984), as is the case with values, perceptions, life goals, self-confidence, 
and identity. Explanations are based on social as well as biological (especially genetic)  
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grounds and evolutionary theories, the mix of them being dependent on the focus of 
research interest in the entire range between ontogenetic development and sociocultural 
formation of personality. Thus, developmental psychology is at least in principle more 
open to the whole range of explanatory factors relevant to explaining human behavior and 
the shaping of individual life courses. However, its conceptual apparatus and efforts in 
disentangling the socio-structural explanatory factors as opportunities and constraints for 
individual development are in practice far less developed than in sociology. Nevertheless, 
when viewing social factors as defining adaptive tasks for the individual, developmental 
psychology overcomes the sociological perspective of social forces impinging in a 
uniform, more or less deterministic way on individual lives and behavior.
 It allows for 
specifying the variety of ways in which individuals react to social opportunities and 
constraints, and how they do this by translating them not only into overt behavior but also 
into perceptions, beliefs, and goals. Thus, life courses are surely ‘products’ or ‘mirrors’ of 
social institutions, culture, and history (Mayer, 1997) - which is often neglected in 
developmental psychology - and they are also at the same time the product of individuals 
as natural organisms, decision-makers and personalities. As ‘product’ of these forces, 
individuals cannot be reduced to mere ‘puppets.’ Besides, modern sociology increasingly 
adopts the point of view that the binding power of institutions and norms is weakened, thus 
challenging, and at the same time enabling, the individual to select or develop action 
orientations and own biographical scripts beyond well-defined patterns and reactions. In 
other words, action orientations and biographical scripts cannot be simply deduced from 
social circumstances alone. 
 
The question arises, then, whether this rather unrelated coexistence of sociological life 
course research and psychological research on individual development characterizes a 
sensible and useful division of labor. My answer is: No, if we accept that genetic and social 
causal factors are not separated but intertwined in everything we can observe in individual 
lives, and that individual decisions do matter. The arguments for this view are visualized 
in Figure 1: 
 
•  Everything we can observe at the individual level at any time is, in theoretical terms, 
supposed to be an interaction effect of social and genetic influences and individual 
choices stemming from cumulative processes over time; (almost) nothing of it is 
purely social or purely genetic in terms of causal understanding. Rutter (1997) 
provides many illustrative examples of how observed behaviour or individual 
characteristics are, to different degrees and by different types of causal relationships, 
caused by different kinds of interactions of genetic and social factors. If one is ready 
to accept this perspective, a necessary consequence is that in order to study social 
influences comprehensively, they cannot be separated from an assessment of genetic 
influences and previous interactions between genetic and social influences - simply 
because these causal factors are not merely additive. 
 
•  This applies to both research agendas existing in the field of life course research - life 
history studies (mostly situated in sociology) and studies of individual development 
(mostly situated in psychology). And, it implies that two widespread 
misunderstandings have to be rejected as guiding  principles  
 Theoretical Issues – Martin Diewald 
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Figure 1 
The Multi-level/Multi-layer Embeddedness  
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for research designs. First, in terms of a generative process, life histories are not per se 
exclusively  ‘social’    and  psychological  developments  are  not  
exclusively genetic or ‘psychological’ as opposed to ‘social.’ Thus, the Durkheiman 
‘explaining the social (only) by the social’ as a rationale for sociological life course 
research is misleading when used to exclude psychological concepts from explanation.  
 
•  Individual-level measurements cannot be adequate independent measurements of 
social influences, since all the other causal factors are integrally confounded with such 
measurements. In this sense, Bronfenbrenner and Crouter (1983) have proposed to call 
individual attributes - like belonging to a specific social class, or having a certain 
status - as ‘social address’ rather than as measurements of the social structure, be it 
positional structure, or social networks, or collective actors bargaining about stability 
and change in social systems and offering opportunities and constraints for individual 
action (see Figure 1). In other words, if we are interested in structural effects, we have 
problems with identifying them in individual-level data alone. 
 
•  Moreover, both research agendas (life histories, individual development), though 
actually existing quite unconnected side by side, comprise processes that are 
integrally linked to each other. Therefore, for purposes of causal understanding as a 
generative process, both streams of development and their interactions have to be 
taken into account - even if we are only interested in understanding either life histories 
or psychological developments alone. This may be necessary to avoid ambiguity in the 
causal meaning of an individual attribute at a given time in terms of a generative 
process. Suppose, for instance, we want to assess the theoretical meaning of the 
achieved level of education for some later life course events, such as getting a job in 
the labor market, income attainment, or leading a successful life in general. The effect 
of educational degrees may be due to anyone of the following: (1) actual differentials 
in task-specific abilities, (2) differentials in task-specific abilities assumed by 
employers, (3) actual differentials in more general abilities like fluid intelligence, or 
crystallized intelligence represented more or less by differential educational degrees, 
(4) differentials in more general abilities like fluid intelligence, or crystallized 
intelligence as perceived by possible employers, (5) institutional rules providing more 
or less credentials, something like ‘planful competence’ correlated with amount of 
education (Clausen 1991), and (6) the differential availability of jobs in different 
segments of the labor market. 
 
Thus, only analysis of parallel processes of both (sociological) life histories and 
(psychological) individual development is able to provide a rather complete understanding 
of society shaping the lives of individuals. Going back to the ‘genes’ or ‘individuality’ 
therefore is desirable, but even without it the parallel analysis of life histories and 
individual development is useful for both strands of research. The discussion of 
‘individuality’ and individual action in the next section will clarify this argument. 
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(3) Individuality and individual action 
 
‘Individuality’ may be defined as differences in personality, whether they be genetically 
fixed or acquired and accumulated by different experiences over the life course. At first 
glance, the term ‘individuality’ as a relevant aspect of sociological research may contradict 
the rule formulated above that it is social regularities that have to be the focus of research. 
This is misleading, however. 
 
 
•  Even if one is less interested in the study of the life course as such than in the 
functioning of social institutions or systems of social inequalities, the question of 
nature/nurture interactions is not irrelevant. This is because the assessment of social 
inequalities as outcomes at the individual level also requires an assessment of existing 
natural inequalities.  Education or employment systems and their historical change 
can be thought of as being administered to make efficient use of competencies and 
personality types (Turner, 1988:9) as they are available at different stages of the life 
course according to selection and adaptation principles formulated, for instance, as 
meritocracy and skill development. These institutions are thus primarily defined by 
their selections of people and the selections they initiate as self-selections of 
individuals according to perceptions and action orientations formed by prior 
experiences. 
 
•  The evolutionary perspective outlined above, and especially the hinge function of the 
nervous system for “working out adaptations”, have two implications for the study of 
individual decision-making. First, the assumption of stable preferences over time as 
well as the assumption that all actors have the same preferences cannot be upheld (see 
Opp, 1998:218-227). Rationales for action do not simply follow a logic of the present 
situation but are developed by people who are thinking ahead and may learn 
constantly (Elster, 1989; Burkhauser and Smeeding, 1999:2-3). The standard 
assumptions of economic ‘black box’ rational choice theory of actors with constant 
preferences stem from times when more elaborate psychological action models did not 
yet exist (Albert, 1999:224). Besides, it does not make sense to reserve the idea of 
individual choice for overt behavior only, and to conceptualize orientations in all cases 
as prior to choices. Theories of adaptive coping (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984) or 
developmental regulation (Heckhausen and Schulz, 1995) make evident that stability 
or changes in orientations are often alternatives to stability or change in overt 
behaviors. 
 
•  Perceptions and orientations should not be conceived of as being contrasts to structural 
opportunities and constraints in explaining life course states and events. In a 
longitudinal perspective - and only in a longitudinal perspective – they are themselves 
formed by earlier structural forces in interaction with other causal factors. Neglecting 
them would not lead, as intended, to focus exclusively on ‘explaining the social by the 
social,’ but would rather lead to underestimate the importance of ‘the social’ which is 
represented in psychological states too. They have double importance as determinants 
for individual self-selection as well as criteria for selection by collective actors and Unitary Social Science for Causal Understanding Toward  
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institutions. 
 
•  In the case that genetic information as a primary source of individual development and 
behavior that is relevant for a specific research question is not available (and despite 
considerable progress in the field this is normally still the case), the generative process 
should be traced as far back as possible towards genetic determinants. The interaction 
between the various classes of factors, mediated by individual choices, is a process 
that follows historical as well individual time clocks. If we want to disentangle the 
effects of genes and social environments, we have to start as early as possible with the 
observation of individual lives, if possible at conception, and from then on follow (1) 
how conditions above the individual level may change, (2) how individuals bring an 
accumulating history of past life experiences with them to each transition, interpret the 
circumstances in terms of this legacy, and work out adaptations that can alter their life 
course (Elder and O’Rand 1995:456).  
 
 
At this moment, it may be appropriate to recall that hardly any existing data set will meet 
all the demands formulated in this section. However, the comprehensive life course 
approach may serve as framework for formulating hypotheses about social mechanisms 
creating social regularities that may lie behind the correlations found in conventional, 
longitudinal social survey data. For the future, it may serve as a rationale for amalgamated 
studies to fill out the black boxes left in usual designs. 
 
The theoretical inclusion of genes as possible explanatory factor may lead to some 
reluctance against such an approach among social scientists, representing an unlimited and 
“unqualified demand for explanation” (Ultee, 1996). Or, it may lead to the hint that several 
statistical procedures now exist that permit control for selection biases and unobserved 
heterogeneity. Therefore, I wish to demonstrate the need for research designs that follow 
the arguments presented here by applying these arguments in the next section to a research 
agenda which is undoubtedly at the heart of the sociological research tradition: the 
intergenerational reproduction of social inequality. 
 
 
The Intergenerational Reproduction of Social Inequality  
and the Life Course 
 
The common central question of intergenerational mobility and status attainment research 
asks whether these processes are on the whole ‘meritocratic’ or not. Meritocracy means, 
first, that there is a relatively open hierarchical positional structure, and that positions at 
different levels are in principle filled according to merit differentials by means of 
competition. There is, however, a second assumption, which is usually linked to the idea of 
meritocracy: Ascriptive features should not distort the influence of merit on status 
attainment (or on access to higher classes). In other words, it should be merit and nothing 
but merit which is relevant in this respect. This second assumption is reasonable since 
hardly any society can be imagined which is not based on some kind of meritocracy.  
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This sounds more straightforward than it is in reality, because it assumes a more or less 
additive relationship between ascription and merit: Either it is achievement (or merit) that 
matters, or it is ascription. In reality, however, both are intertwined in mutually generative 
processes over the life course, and this makes it quite difficult to test for meritocracy or 
even to define it without ambiguity. As I will show in the following, sociological research 
usually fails to meet the inherently necessary conditions to test for meritocracy against 
social advantage or disadvantage represented first of all by the class, status, and/or income 
of the family of origin. This notion of social advantage or disadvantage implies that some 
“natural”, non-social starting point is needed to define merit as opposed to ascription. 
 
The argumentation starts with the simple question of what 'merit' is. The simplest and at 
the same time most frequent answer is the formula: ability plus effort, or more literally, 
“individual talent, hard work, and the determination to succeed” (Bond and Saunders, 
1999:245). In any case, it is wrong to equate merit simply with IQ. Relating it to 
developmental psychology, I propose that it is useful, in the development of ‘ability plus 
effort’, to distinguish between (1)  a few basic and very general competences (e.g. 
cognitive speed), (2)  more specific competences (e.g., planful action competence, social 
skills), (3) a multi-level, multi-domain variety of performance  (e.g., IQ test scores or 
verbal ability test scores as particular types of intellectual performance; school marks and 
achieved level of schooling and training; or context-adequate patterns of perception, 
interpretation, and taste), (4) the differentiation between different levels of social 
‘visibility’ of performances
4, and (5) the placement within the class or status hierarchy of a 
society. This sequence is open to two different definitions of what 'merit' is. ‘Merit’ as 
opposed to ascription, as ‘natural’, ‘pre-social’ abilities, is restricted to the first, perhaps 
even the second stage, captured by very early measurements of these competences or 
genetically sensitive research designs if not by the genes themselves. ‘Merit’ as something 
a society must value in order to maintain and advance itself, however, is (visible) 
performance. Thus, the meritocracy question can be reasonably operationalized by the 
tension between the two definitions, or better as a lifelong generative process of mutually 
effective social conditions - which may be more or less advantageous - and performances 
evolving out of the competences, which also have to become visible in order to have 
consequences within the system of social stratification. 
 
There is at least one critical point in this chain of transformations in these mutually shaping 
processes, and this applies to what Bourdieu (1977) has strongly argued: To a lesser degree 
than cognitive competences, so-called ‘soft skills’ (such as visible performances like 
‘cultural capital’) are not always ‘innocent’ performances in the sense that they are directly 
relevant for the tasks that characterize  more or less valued occupations, but are liable to 
serve social closure instead. This may be true, but I would argue that the observation of 
whether and how some individuals develop such more context-specific performances 
(which are at the same time more open to conditions of advantage and disadvantage) out of 
more basic (and more genetically determined) competences, and others do not, is perhaps 
the most straightforward way to relate these context-specific performances to the earlier 
starting point of the development of more general competences. 
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However, this is not at all the way in which this question is handled in sociological research 
on the reproduction of social inequalities. Two main research traditions can be 
distinguished in this field: (1) the mostly American stream of status attainment research and 
(2) the mostly European, and especially British, class structuration approach. 
 
In the status attainment tradition, occupational success is most directly seen as the outcome 
of individual characteristics, namely effort and ability, mediated by educational success. 
The advantageous or disadvantageous significance of the status of the family of origin is 
deduced from differential encouragement of children by their parents to perform well at 
school. It is mostly this influence on effort that is supposed to capture the ascriptive 
meaning of status of family of origin. Further elaboration of this approach with more 
detailed life course data break down the linkage between education and occupational status 
into several single steps (e.g., Kerckhoff, 1995) but do not touch on the linkage between 
the family of origin and education except family structure and the intergenerational 
transmission of success aspiration. Sometimes, ability measures like verbal ability or IQ 
scores are included, but measurements are always collected only after school entry. 
 
This research tradition can be attacked for several reasons. The most common is that it 
neglects structure (Breen and Goldthorpe, 1999:1-7; Savage and Egerton, 1997:648-649). 
A ‘variable race’  between individual factors and ‘structural’  factors, both measured as 
individual characteristics, in regression-type analyses is by no way appropriate in order to 
assess their relative importance in causing social mobility. There are, however, several 
attempts to include measures of organizational and labor market structures in mobility 
studies to distinguish between positions and persons allocated to these positions (e.g. 
Sørensen, 1986a; DiPrete, 1993). These studies are, however, more or less restricted to 
shed enough light on the connections between educational attainment, first labor force and 
later labor force placements, and they do not take into account the individual development 
of competences, performances, or aspirations. In other words, the black boxes of the 
classical Wisconsin approach are mostly seen as located on the “long way between 
elementary school and adult social class position” (Mayer 1999:8), but obviously less in 
the short but important link between social origin and educational attainment. 
 
What consequences does this omission have for answering the question of meritocracy? No 
less than that ‘social origin’ as the theoretical starting point of reproduction of social 
inequality remains theoretically ambiguous in important respects. Since basic competences 
are genetically inherited to a considerable degree, and more specific competences as well 
as performances beginning with birth are also socially constructed, natural ‘merit’ and 
socially constructed ‘merit’ evolving out of natural merit cannot be separated. The rigorous 
and angry sociological criticisms of the ‘Bell Curve’ by Herrnstein and Murray (1994) that 
IQ measurements of children are not valid indicators of genetically inherited competences 
are absolutely correct on several grounds. But on the other hand, it is true that without 
capturing the reciprocal processes between competence development and its social 
precursors from the very beginning of individual life, it is impossible to differentiate 
between the ‘innocent’ natural differences in competences and the socially constructed 
development of competences and performances. Therefore, later assessments of IQ and 
other abilities/competences cannot be contrasted as socially exogenous “merit” against Theoretical Issues – Martin Diewald 
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social advantages and disadvantages represented by the family of origin. Children from 
families with higher status or class position are more likely than children from families 
with lower status or class position to have the kinds of talents and personal qualities which 
are required in order to achieve success both by genetic inheritance and early socialization. 
 
The other major tradition of research on the intergenerational reproduction of social 
inequality is the class structuration approach identifying patterns of association between 
the social class membership of fathers and sons. One big advantage of the class mobility 
approach is that by separating stability and change in the marginal distributions from total 
mobility, structural opportunities for mobility can be taken into account without drawing 
on data sources other than individual survey data. Here again, the same objection regarding 
the theoretical status of class of origin can be raised: “Finding a clear statistical association 
between class origins and class destinations, researchers have tended to assume that this is 
the product of social advantage or disadvantage. The explanation for why they do better on 
average than working-class children therefore lies in differences in their social 
environments - their homes, their schools, their peer groups” (Saunders, 1997:261). It is 
true that Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992), to cite the most prominent representatives of this 
approach, impute differential properties to individuals according to their class of origin. 
But again, this theoretically excludes natural competences, and it does not try to 
differentiate between various social factors linked to class membership more than in a 
purely additive way. As we have seen, however, it is simply and irrefutably wrong to 
assign only to parental status/class meanings of socially inherited advantages and 
disadvantages, as vice versa for pure genetic inheritance. It is not examined empirically 
whether children from higher classes succeed better due to more parental encouragement, 
or due to better material living conditions, or due to early learning of middle-class ways of 
thinking, speaking, and behaving, or due to attending better schools, or finally due to 
parental networks mobilized to place them in better jobs. 
 
I conclude this section by arguing that (American) sociology got in some way exactly the 
‘Bell Curve war’ it deserved. Why? The sociological research on the reproduction of social 
inequality for a long time could rely on a ‘Zeitgeist,’ a societal agreement, that inequalities 
are essentially if not exclusively socially constructed, a construction which can be designed 
by public policy, and that natural inequalities do not matter. During this decade, this 
Zeitgeist has powerfully changed to the disadvantage of affirmative action. It now favors 
theories that try to identify genetic roots of human behavior. This shift now challenges 
sociology much more than before to carefully disentangle both kinds of effects. 
Considerable efforts have been undertaken to do this, but the most painful ambiguity shall 
remains: What precisely does social status, class position or income situation of the family 
of origin mean for the intergenerational transmission of social inequality? 
 
The increasing awareness of this problem has not in the least led to a considerable 
expansion in the use of statistical modeling techniques that take care of selection problems 
and unobserved heterogeneity. Without doubt, this is a considerable progress, since at least 
it allows differentiating between purely correlational relationships, which in fact must be 
traced back to other common background factors, and ‘true’  relationships. Yet it does not 
solve well enough the problem of bringing light to the black boxes which hide the Unitary Social Science for Causal Understanding Toward  
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generative processes that bring about advantage and disadvantage during the life course, 
especially in the case that the alternatives to purely correlational relationships are not made 
clear.
5 
 
 
Action Theory, Control Beliefs, and Life Course Events 
 
Rational-choice theories and action models have gained more and more terrain in sociology 
and empirical social research (Coleman 1990). This theoretical turn seems to correspond to 
a socio-historical shift in modern societies from external enforcement by collective 
pressures, norms and material incentives to more individualization by internal motivation 
and flexible planning and decision-making (Beck, 1986). When relating to individuals as 
decision-makers, however, sociologists tend to a concept of the individual actor where 
motives for action are either universal, like in economics (Lindenberg, 1989), or 
sufficiently derived from their location in the social structure and system of social 
inequalities (Goldthorpe, 1998). Deeper understandings of the personality standing behind 
decision-making, or, in other words, of what constitutes the hinge function of the nervous 
system for working out adaptations to the environment, are seen as idiosyncrasies that are 
not relevant to sociological explanation. 
 
Yet, as I argued already in the second section, this demarcation is not at all convincing, 
since we can learn from an evolutionary perspective that individuals are not only externally 
driven agents, or ‘structural puppets,’ but that their capacities and aims as agents are 
formed by a number of different forces, many of them being social or interacting with 
social factors. Characteristics of personality belong to these forces. I will demonstrate this 
in the following by discussing, as an example, the psychological concepts of 
developmental control and control beliefs. For my argument here I can rather neglect the 
differences between different control theories. 
 
All theories of developmental control in a broader sense (e.g.,  Heckhausen and Schulz, 
1995; Bandura, 1977; Bandura, 1992; Baltes and Baltes, 1990; Krampen, 1988) follow the 
basic assumption that individuals want to exert control over their own development either 
by actively shaping their environment or by adapting one’s goals to an environment which 
is not easily changeable. Control beliefs are convictions about which factors are most 
relevant for a successful life: external societal conditions (e.g., the educational system or 
the labor market), internal resources (e.g., IQ, effort, health) or simply chance. Control 
beliefs may be more or less consistent with actual opportunities and constraints in the 
educational system, or with actual IQ of the individual; in other words, they are not simply 
correlates of ‘objective’ living conditions and life events. 
 
Control beliefs are formed by current social opportunities and constraints, and also by the 
former life course. Thus, they represent important elements of individual coping with 
present as well as past social conditions, though they are not simple subjective 
representations of these present and past social circumstances. And, vice versa, these 
beliefs structure the individual choices of different control strategies and, thus, the future 
choice of behavior in addition to these actual opportunities and constraints (Heckhausen Theoretical Issues – Martin Diewald 
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and Schulz, 1995). 
 
My own analyses of the social situation and occupational careers of East Germans of 
different birth cohorts during the transformation clarify how the inclusion of indicators of 
individual development into the study of life histories can further the understanding of life 
courses. In the East German Life Course Study of the Max Planck Institute for Human 
Development in Berlin, we additionally included a single-point measurement of control 
beliefs and subjective tenacity and flexibility as different control strategies when collecting 
information in 1991/92 from the East Germans (of the birth cohorts of 1929-31, 1939-41, 
1951-53, and 1959-61) about their retrospective life histories before and after the Berlin 
wall came down. Though these one-shot measurements are not yet the parallel 
measurement of life histories and individual development argued for in this article, they 
can sufficiently demonstrate the potential use of this research strategy. This demonstration 
applies to the social construction of such beliefs by biographical and socio-historical 
processes as well as to the impact of such psychological dispositions for later life course 
outcomes (Diewald 2000). 
 
The examination of how control beliefs, control strategies, and self-esteem varied between 
different groups of East Germans in 1991/92 showed some unexpected results, which are 
important to understand the consequences of the East German transformation (Diewald, 
Huinink and Heckhausen, 1996; Heckhausen, 1999). Psychological theories of 
developmental regulation predict that control beliefs and control strategies vary with age in 
a monotonic fashion, and there is a body of empirical research supporting this prediction. 
Younger adults rely on primary control strategies and control beliefs emphasizing own 
efforts and abilities. When growing older, secondary control beliefs become more 
important, and external control conditions are more emphasized. Both strategies are able to 
maintain self-esteem. However, this general expectation did not hold true for East 
Germany in 1991/92. The 1939-41 birth cohort displayed the unique combination of a low 
level of persistence in the pursuit of life goals and a high level of inflexibility in adjusting 
these goals. One could assume that specifically for this cohort, changing living conditions 
and a devaluation of formerly accumulated resources led to lower levels of internal control 
beliefs, primary control, and a lowered self-esteem. Multivariate analyses showed indeed 
that these losses were partly due to their bad labor market situation now compared to the 
relatively good career chances they experienced before 1989 as well as compared to the 
labor market situation of the other cohorts after 1989. The first relates to the fact that due 
to specific historical circumstances this cohort experienced superior career opportunities in 
the GDR compared to all younger cohorts. But after 1989, this cohort had fewer 
opportunities than the younger ones who were better able to accommodate to the 
requirements of the new labor market. And in the older cohort, those born between 1929-
31, almost all employees lost their employment due to early retirement schemes that were 
introduced immediately after the wall came down to relieve the labor market. The oldest 
group, which had also very good career opportunities in the GDR before 1989, could 
externalize the reasons for losses after 1989, keep its sense of prior successes, and keep its 
self-esteem intact. Thus it was for the cohort 1939-41 that devaluation of formerly 
accumulated resources and investments were highest and opportunities to grasp new 
chances were lowest among all cohorts.  Unitary Social Science for Causal Understanding Toward  
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By this study, we were able to show that specific historical conditions of sudden societal 
change (the political transformation) and specific societal conditions situated in time before 
and after 1989 brought about a situation, where for one age group the usual interplay 
between possible control strategies could not hold anymore.  It is noteworthy, however, 
that the explanation of cohort-specific differences in control beliefs and control strategies 
by controlling for social characteristics and life course events like career mobility before 
1989, career mobility after 1989, gains and losses in the sphere of family and social 
networks, and other covariates like affiliation to the communist party, was only partly 
successful. Even beyond differences between cohorts in these respects, there remained 
differences in control beliefs between cohorts. This points to a collective, comprehensive 
loss of future perspectives for this cohort, which cannot be fully explained even by quite 
detailed sociological information. 
 
Loss of control is not only an important indicator of quality of life but relevant to a variety 
of life course decisions and events sociologists are interested in. Individuals with a high 
level of self-efficacy or high internal control beliefs are better discerners and users of 
information, have more advantages from social support, they tend to be more optimistic 
about the success of their own efforts and abilities, and they tend to use these comparative 
advantages to reach advantageous positions which further strengthen their sense of control. 
Perceived control can therefore be seen as a product of prior experiences in the society as 
well as a psychological resource leading to a more active and persistent problem solving 
behaviour when confronted with stressors. 
 
It would be short sighted, however, to see such beliefs as individual characteristics only. 
The question is to which degree these specific action competences reflect not only 
individual traits and resources but also "institutionalized ways of thinking" (Douglas, 
1986:63) in a specific society in the sense that social structure is shaping individual 
behaviour by generating interests and predispositions. For example, Sørensen (1986b) 
points to the seminal, ideal-typical difference between open-and-closed-position systems. 
These provide different opportunities and constraints for individual achievement strivings, 
and they define different mechanisms to obtain the achievement goals. Much more than in 
closed-position systems, career patterns in open-position systems should reflect a 
development of individual strivings and capacities. But, “in closed-position systems, it is 
structure that creates success and failures, efficacy and depression" (pp. 196). Therefore, 
especially in open-position systems, the certificates and occupational positions held by an 
individual should reflect individual agency and an unfolding of individual competences. It 
is mostly in closed-position systems that we find individual competences developing to a 
high degree in person-situation interactions outside or even against the formal institutions 
of education and occupation. Thus, when looking at the impact of control beliefs on 
occupational careers (Diewald, 2000), my interest was primarily on the assessment of how 
open or closed the East German labour market was for individual effort and ability after 
1989. 
 
To summarize, I found different control strategies having only weak or intermediate 
correlations with failure and success at the labor market after 1989. This is an unexpected Theoretical Issues – Martin Diewald 
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result, since a system transformation should create an almost open situation. But, as I have 
demonstrated elsewhere in detail (Diewald, 1999; Mayer, Diewald and Solga, 1999), this is 
less surprising in view of the overwhelming impact of legislative and other rulings of the 
East German transformation, leading to immediate and irreversible mass unemployment on 
the one hand and much occupational stability on the other. 
 
 
Conclusion:  
The Need for Transdisciplinary and  
“Amalgamated” Study Designs 
 
I have strongly argued for linking life histories to individual development (including in 
particular the multi-step conversion and differentiation of natural competences into visible 
performances) to solve problems of causal explanation in the field of intergenerational 
transmission of social inequality. The advantages of this strategy are threefold. First, it is 
both theoretically and empirically the best way of filling the gap between family of origin 
and school enrollment, where the selection and adaptation processes by formal institutions 
can hardly be the key to study societal selection processes, simply because there are not 
many processes of selection. Second, it provides the necessary theoretical link between 
‘natural’ inequalities and the social definition and formation of inequalities in 
competences. And third, also during later childhood, adolescence, and adulthood, it 
provides the necessary link to the understanding of the selection and adaptation processes 
of institutions and organizations. 
 
As the example of control beliefs has shown convincingly, the inclusion of personality 
characteristics is not merely for disentangling the interplay between life histories and 
individual development. Assessing the formation and the impact of personality 
characteristics or later life course outcomes is crucial for describing the institutional 
systems of societies. 
 
It should have become clear that the classical justification for present practices, namely to 
explain social phenomena (only) by social facts, is non tenable in light of the fact that 
genetic, ecological, and social factors are not additive to one another but intertwined in 
reciprocal, mutually shaping relationships. This does not only make it questionable to 
reduce the study design to standard sociological information if causal explanation by 
generative processes is the primary research goal. In this sense, the causal meaning of 
information collected in one strand of life course research - whether life histories or 
individual development - may often be ambiguous in itself. This applies not only for 
explananda but also for explanatory factors. IQ scores are obvious examples (often used as 
proxy for genetically and/or socially inherited ability), as well as educational degrees 
(often used as indicators of ability, performance, or credentials). 
 
Looking at the international situation in this field, the US and Great Britain seem to be far 
better off than Germany and France. As I mentioned in the second section, especially in the 
United States social surveys exist which include test scores of different kinds, like IQ, 
school marks, or measures of verbal ability. For instance, the PSID includes now some Unitary Social Science for Causal Understanding Toward  
Longitudinal Research in the Social Sciences 
 
 241
information on child development and psychological scales of developmental regulation. 
And both in the US and in Great Britain there exist life course studies that start during 
childhood, like the NYLS or the NCDS, which do not exist in most other countries. Even 
these studies fail, however, in studying the very early formation in life and, thus, the causal 
meaning of the family of origin. But even all these positive examples are still far away 
from taking life courses and psychological development seriously as parallel, 
interdependent bundles of processes forming human lives. 
 
The other source of ambiguity of causal meaning in standard social surveys is the missing 
contextual information, like neighborhood contexts, organizational ecologies, social 
networks beyond the respondent’s interpretation, or national institutional arrangements. 
Research has made considerable progress during the last decade in combining individual 
level quantitative data at different levels, including qualitative data or experimental 
designs, and in promoting international comparisons (Burkhauser and Smeeding, 1999:26-
28; Hill and Duncan, 1999; Mayer, 1997). 
 
Thus, classical longitudinal social surveys are important for causal understanding, but 
usually they overtax their explanatory power if they have to bear the burden of substantive 
causal explanation all alone. What we need now is a greater integration of psychological 
and sociological concepts, starting as early as possible in life, and in the future the 
readiness to integrate natural and social science research designs as well. 
 
 
End Notes: 
 
1.   For a general discussion see, for instance, Blossfeld and Rohwer, 1995: ch.1; Mayer 
and Huinink, 1990; Alwin, 1995. For several illustrative examples in the field of 
income and poverty dynamics, see Burkhauser and Smeeding, 1999. 
2.   The longitudinal survey programs, which are most similar to the GSOEP in the Anglo-
Saxon world, are the PSID in the US and the BHPS (British Household Panel Project) 
in Great Britain. 
3.   In up to now three waves (1994 to 1996), however, at least a simple collapsed scale for 
measuring control beliefs has been included, focusing on the distinction between 
internal and external control beliefs (Krampen, 1987, 1988). Control beliefs refer to 
convictions about whether own (‘internal’) competences and resources or ‘external’ 
social conditions and luck are most relevant for life course failures and successes. 
 
4.   Tilly and Tilly (1998:201) as well as Kerckhoff (1995:488) argue that it is exactly 
visible performance and not performance or ability per se which is relevant for 
occupational and educational success. 
5.   Nor is the effect of “true” causal variables per se understood as ‘generative process.’ 
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